Thursday, November 10, 2016

Marx and Marxism

By Andrew Aaron

There is, there must be a good deal of caution used when one discusses human nature and Marx's view of it. It is somewhat easier to diagram (at least partially) a Gandhian picture of human nature. The reasons for this have as much to do with the structure of communism, as well as Marx's way of seeing humanity. Another problem, and perhaps more basic, is the complexity, scope, and breadth of Marx's writing and the way that writing has been filtered, repackaged, reformulated, shortened or lengthened, and overall, edited as it makes its way through society(s). The first two problems will be dealt with during this essay, the last will be touched on at the end.1

Locke, Hobbes, the libertarians, the utilitarians, all have in common a belief in the power of the individual. Although it would seem that the “greatest happiness” principle is one of collectivism, it really is an individualistic idea. Each individual must and does seek their own best happiness. Now, this may be inside a group, but it does not have to be. The power of the enlightenment belief in the individual, in man as prime actor in the drama of history was and is pervasive. We, at the end of the twentieth century, still wrestle with the age old rubric of the "great (individual) men” of history. This idea, which is millennia-old (or more), certainly became a central force during the enlightenment and the renaissance. Both The Prince and Leviathan are examples of the "great men" pushed to their logical conclusion. The rugged individualism of American thought had deep roots in the writings of Locke. Yes, the social contract is a good. Yes, the Bible is correct when it speaks of "it not being good for man to be alone,” but it is always at the discretion of the individual to stay or leave and bear the consequences of that choice.

The belief in the individual that characterizes many of the philosophers and political writers that the course covered had interesting ramifications for the systems that they created or espoused. Democracy is the great individual political movement.  “One man, one vote” is so clear a statement of this that almost no more need be said. Almost. By making the individual so powerful, there is a loosening of the bonds of history, of circumstance. The extreme end of this view is that of the self-help books that clamor on the shelves of bookstores. Each one is pushing hard to make the individual responsible for their own lives, for their own destinies. “America is the land of opportunity. Anyone can make it here” are familiar phrases that are used to boost America. It is beyond the scope of this essay to debate the merits of these beliefs, they are merely examples of how deeply influential individualism and the belief in the freedom of the individual to make his or her own destiny is in our society.

What makes Marxism so radical in its view of the individual is how it strips much autonomy away from the individual. The theory of human nature in Marxism was (and is) new in philosophy. It is assumed that man entered into the social contract for various reasons. It is further assumed that this was a good thing. Marx seems to accept most of the ideas about the state of nature and the social contract that went before him. However, where Hobbes saw man as a baseless creature, very much a loner, who is constrained and kept in check by the social contract, Marx sees the social contract as a good that arises naturally out of the fact that man is a creature of community. Where Locke sees the social contract as a binding instrument that exists to allow the good nature of man to thrive and prosper, to create and develop the greater good of capitalism, Marx sees capitalism as an evil that changed the very nature of humanity's relation to the world and weakened the social bonds of the social contract.

For Marx, the debate between Hobbes and Locke about the goodness or baseness of man is almost moot. Marx as a scientist, or at least a philosopher who tried to be as scientific as possible, saw man as an animal, highly intelligent and capable, but an animal nonetheless. We begin to see now, one of the two problems I spoke of at the beginning of this paper. It is hard for me to see man as an individual in Marxist thinking. I continue to see humanity as a pack animal who moves through history in group formations. Whatever the system of government, whatever the system of trade, man is acted on largely as part of a group. Marx views human nature not as the conflict between good and evil, or as the battleground between opposing moral forces but almost as a changing object that is subject to the power of economic forces. Human nature is no to be redeemed by religious or spiritual forces. It is not to be saved by the intervention of superior moral forces, although they may be created later on in history. Human nature is in continuous flux, and growth rising from one thought pattern created by economics to another until finally it reaches or will reach that of the consciousness of the proletariat.

Now, the second problem arises. Because Marx does not see human nature as good or evil, inherently, the reason that humanity does what it does must be located elsewhere. I touched on this briefly in the last paragraph. Marx is very much a believer in progress, in an inevitable course of events unfolding along dynamic economic lines. The old barter, small-town economy gives way to feudalism, which yields to small capitalism then large capitalism and industrialism, which ushers in the growth of a massive growth of workers, the proletariat, who will lead the world to communism and freedom from economic slavery. In the Marxist model, while there may be individual acts of wrong doing, indeed there must be many acts of economic cruelty and corruption to push the need for economic change. However, the capitalist can only act this way. Even those capitalists who try to do the "right thing" are doomed to failure and worse. Hence, the disdain that both Marx and, especially, Engels have for utopian socialists, for anyone who advocates capitalism with a friendly face.

Because of the systemic, almost inevitable, way that economics and history unfold in the Marxist model, indeed history is just the playing out of economic forces, because of this, it is difficult to posit where exactly human freedom or individual action exists in Marxist thought and what part these may play. I am not sure if it does, and if it does, how important either or both are in the Marxist scheme of things. One answer to this problem may be that human freedom, truly individuated individuals, real autonomy exist until after the revolution of the proletariat and many years of stripping away the baggage of capitalism and the instilling of new values, values that come from the proletariat. If this is the case, then it would seem that Marx is actually far closer to utopians like Thomas Moore and Jonathan Swift than not. However, unlike the utopias of these two writers, utopias that seem to have always existed without change, Marx has a plan to get there. Because in the end, Marx believes in the perfectibility of the race. Hell is found present on earth in the workhouses and prisons of Dickens' England, in the fire of the Triangle shirt company, in the child labor practices of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Heaven is waiting to be created in the years after the revolution of the proletariat.

Yet, and yet. The golden period that will come has to be worked towards. As inevitable as the revolution seems to be, Marx did believe in struggling for it anyway. He wrote, published papers, set up groups, was arrested, and exiled for his actions. So, in what appears to be a contradiction, Marx the individual (with a few cohorts) helped to lay the groundwork for the collective revolution. This opens a space for an interesting question. Is there room in Marx's theories for political action?

 It would appear on the surface, at least, that voting, lobbying, and the other tools and strategies that make democracy work (or not) would be absent in the Marxist world. The high degree of individual choice coupled with the way politics often force crossing of class lines, making for strange bedfellows, stands in direct contrast to the way power is taken in Marxist thought by the workers. Since it is only by seizing the means of production, that the workers gain power, all the tools of democracy that are used to gain influence and power are rendered superfluous. It is only after that the proletariat is in control that the democratic tools come into use. Even then, they are circumscribed so as to not allow capitalists to regain control. At base, democracy is clearly a middle-class idea. The American Revolution and the Puritan Revolution in England were both middle-class revolutions as such, and like the bourgeois class itself, democracy has its merits over monarchy but is inferior to communism. Marx is a believer in progress, and in his case, he has a very definite idea about where it all should lead to in the end.
I mentioned a final, more basic problem, above. One might term this problem as the problem of mass dissemination. The man wrote and published a great deal. His final works were edited and published posthumously. Whether in the hands of able, honest, careful translators (either from one language to another or from difficult to layperson) or in the hands of less scrupulous translators and redactors, Marx and his ideas have been moved widely about. This makes it difficult to arrive at exactly what he was thinking on all issues. It is especially difficult to decide this question of human nature. However, I think some conclusions might be in order. Marx does believe in the perfectibility of humanity in the aggregate. He does believe that a human being is not evil by nature but is warped by economic forces. Those forces must finally come under the control of the proletariat in order for humankind to be free. Once this is achieved, there may be no limit to the good, to the progress that humanity can achieve. Marxism is a fairly optimistic theory.

But. I am troubled by aspects of Marx's view of human nature. I am not so willing to disregard the individual's role in history. Nor, for that matter, am I willing to simply view history as the play of economic forces. I am too much a product of my culture(s) to be able to shake off the belief in the power, the drama of the individual to change things for reasons quite apart or beyond economic ones. To some extent, Marx fits very well alongside other scientists and philosophers of the last two hundred years. He, like they, strives for that unified field theory. He, like them, is looking for the big answer that will solve all the questions. Finally, he, like they, is a firm believer in the momentum of history, in the continuous movement forward of the human race. Progress was the definite watchword of his time, as it was for the modernist period of our own century. I am not sure if this is the case. Is there really such a thing as progress? Are we always moving forward? Some religions say that we are devolving, that it has all been downhill since Eden. I do not believe this at all. Yet, I am not convinced in continuous forward progress interrupted by minor setbacks, either. Marxism as an entire theory has much to recommend it. I certainly will not argue with the analysis of capitalism or the sympathy that Marxist thought has for the worker, the downtrodden, even the industrialist as a prisoner of the system. I do take exception with the reduction of man to Homo Economicus. Humanity is far too complicated to be so reduced. Humanity is such a bundle of virtue, vice, neurosis, nonsense, pleasures and pain that I cannot honestly be altogether with Marx's simplification of human nature.

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1.     Of course, the length of this essay itself is a problem. The discussion of Marx's theory of human nature could fill, and does, many books, magazines, and pamphlets. Nevertheless, some attempt will be made to define his theory.

Friday, November 4, 2016

Liberal Humanism

By Andrew Aaron

.It is perhaps, only possible now, to speak of liberal humanism and hermeneutics as cultural products, in the light cast by materialism. The great work that materialism did for cultural critique was to open every area of human endeavor, including materialism, for exploration and critique. Heretofore, each new school of human thought, while fully able to analyze other schools, generally left itself off the hook. Descartes’ doubt extended only so far, Arnold having found high culture looked no further. However, a general discussion along such lines may be somewhat premature. A more particular summary of materialism and its forebears is in order.
Liberal humanism is and has been the dominant model that has governed the West for four hundred years 1. Its strength lies in its ability to speak to deep democratic impulses of liberty, justice, fairness, the centrality of the individual while at the same time allowing any number of imprisonments, injustices, unfairness, and atomization of the individual coupled with group dominance to exist and even flourish under its rubric. In fact, what is most apparent about each of the three models of critique is that they engender in their application, the reasons for new critiques (I will return to this). Liberal humanism fought against theism, authoritarianism, and the static nature of the Middle Ages 2,

The Catholic Church with its vast hierarchy and domination of all religious and much secular matter was perhaps the most organized opponent of liberal humanism. The various feudal monarchies bolstered by divinely given absolute rule had little or no truck with even primitive forms of democracy. Finally, medieval culture was deeply unchanging, to some extent resembling Egypt at its peak. Long years of war, plague, and ignorance all made for an environment that was hardly conducive to breakout thinking 3. Nevertheless, with the reformation of the church, the exploration of the globe, it was only a matter of time before a new model developed. Liberal humanism was that model. It emphasized man as individual, as conqueror of nature.
For Bacon, the superstition of the church and the dogma that enveloped and protected that superstition was anathema. Socrates’ belief that the man of wisdom could discern signs in heaven on how to live was replaced by actually seeing what was in heaven and what was on earth, in nature. Nature that was created just to be understood by man. Bacon saw that culture, therefore, in all its forms must be thoroughly doubted. Where did these ideas come from about the world, about people, about society? Bacon found his key to understanding in the scientific method, Hume went further, and he doubted even science. However, there is something cold and sterile in all this science, Kant attempts to add layers of nuance to liberal humanism. Kant attempts to corral each of the three ways that reason exists by forcing them to be viable only in their fields of endeavor. God's existence cannot be proved or disproved by science since the supernatural falls outside its purview 4. Culture, then, is not autonomous or given divinely for Kant but exists at the interstice of the individual and his world. It becomes the vehicle for pushing man upwards out of the slime and chaos of his past. Progress was an undeniable good for most of the architects of liberal humanists.

I wrote earlier that the critique of any model was found in the very application of the model. Liberal humanism was rigid at times, it relied heavily on science, and it seemingly attempts to place man in kind of perpetual now, as a self-creating individual who can be divorced from his background 5. This model founded on reason could only call into being a model founded on romantic tendencies. Hermeneutics is literally the science of interpretation. Surber derives the word finally from Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods and the carrier of secrets. The hermetic texts were sacred and magical books that could only be deciphered by adepts and only truly understood by those adepts. While the thinkers who developed hermeneutics as a model of understanding and critiquing the world, were not magic seekers by any means (as far as I know) it says something that their model was at least partially based on magical thinking.

The great advance that this, in part, romantic model made over liberal humanism was the development of the idea that culture was a continuously produced, refined, reshaped, organism that depended on the individual and the world that individual inhabited. Moving back and forth between the throwness (past), the circumspective concern (present), and the projection (future), the individual and the group created language, art, writing, dance, in short all that human beings did or said was culture, was text. This being the case, it was the hermeneutisist's job to analyze and decipher what any particular "text" meant for reader and author, for viewer and painter, for observer and choreographer. Hermeneutics as a model may not be as complete or as far-reaching as the other two, but it does lay the groundwork for Deconstructionism in the study of literature, Psychoanalysis in the study of the human mind, Critical Legal Studies in the examination of law and governance. However, just as liberal humanism could become the backbone of the status quo and even quite reactionary (i.e. Arnold), hermeneutics could and sometimes does drift into obscurity, into side issues, leaving the grappling with the world to others.

Surber quotes Marx's line “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however, is to change it,” at least twice in his chapter on the materialist critique. There is excellent reason to repeat this dictum. It is the clearest formation of the difference between materialism as it became under Marx, and either hermeneutics or liberal humanism. Both of the latter are tools to analyze, to probe to understand why and how and what an object, an idea, a civilization is and is not. The former is a tool for all these but it also can be the tool to change the object, the idea, the civilization. Materialism gets its start with Baruch Spinoza, philosopher and theologian, in the 17th century. Spinoza pushed for a matter-based world, the mind and substance not being incompatible6 in such a universe. Once this becomes established, once science makes nature a thing that can be controlled, changed, a purely sensed based view of reality is not going to last long.

As materialism develops, it becomes somewhat mystical under the sway of Hegel. Feuerbach pulls Hegel back and turns him around, shifting his words in order to change the meaning of his sentences. Marx takes this notion and creates a critique of culture in which culture is seen as both the expression of a person and a people as well as the way in which the operative forces of history are masked and hidden from the people. Marx's famous and oft-misunderstood belief "that religion is the opiate of the masses" becomes clear when religion is seen as being a cultural construct that generally supports the those in power, whether by its structure of belief in a kingly God-figure which sets an example for earthly rule, the hierarchy of priests and prelates, or the dogma and superstition that Bacon abhorred 7. Culture is too be critiqued (and criticized) when it occurs under status quo, domineering models of governance and power relationships. When it can occur spontaneously under optimal conditions it is to be embraced, according to Marx. However, as Marxism played itself out in history, becoming Leninist-Stalinist Marxism, it assumed many of the faults and foibles of the regimes it had stood against. This forced a reevaluation of Marxist theory. For the purposes of this essay, Gramsci's view of culture as part of hegemony and anti-hegemony forces, his belief that culture and politics/economics were reciprocal, that is mutually enhancing and detracting is of paramount importance. Materialism is at bottom a view of the universe, that sees all as matter, the "stuff' of the universe, as existing obeying laws, governed by time and space, even human affairs obey these laws. Gramsci and Althusser push Marxism and materialism into new places, new modes of thinking. Together Marxist-Materialism remains as a powerful tool for analysis.

Reading back over this essay, I am struck by how much my language reflects liberal humanism. I speak of "advances," of progress. I talk of engendering; my language is tainted by diachronism. I feel myself missing "the big picture," trapped by my own belief in my individual intelligence. I mentioned Borges before, something of his terror and wariness when confronted by vertiginous thinking by multiplicity of form and sameness. Am I guilty of banality is the essay that others are also guilty of before and after me? How much of my cultural baggage has made this essay what it is and what it is not? Each model that I have discussed contains faults and virtues, the leading virtue and the leading virtue both being that reflexivity, the looking and critiquing the self beyond just the moral but also the political, the scientific, the personal, the cultural, is here to stay.

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1 Culture and Critique, Jere Paul Surber (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998). This figure is quoted on page 45 but the theme of liberal humanism's dominance is repeated often in the course of all three chapters.
2 Ibid. Surber repeats this formulation through chapter I
3 However, it is worth noting that the Greek and Roman knowledge that Bacon, Hume, et al valued, was preserved by monks and clerics in Europe, and the sages/theologians of Islam. Structuralism strikes again.
4 Many atheists dispute this logic.
5 This may explain the American capitalist notions of the self-made man and every individual's ability to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, regardless of their past or how that past may impinge on their present.

6 We are all materialists in our day-to-day lives. I find it hard to imagine really being able to prove to the average person the truth of a David Humian world. Borges's refutation of time might be the last great example in this century.